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defendant's store, plaintiff moved for an order requiring one Jackson to answer
certain questions propounded to him at the taking of his deposition.1 Jackson,
an investigator for defendant's insurer, had ascertained certain facts from witnesses to the accident. The questions, to which Jackson objected on the ground
of privilege, sought to elicit the number and names of persons who he learned
were present at the accident. Held, the motion should be denied on the ground
that the evidence sought was hearsay. Poppino v. Jones Store Co., (D. C. Mo.
FEDERAL COURTS DEPOSITION-DISCOVERY PRACTICE RULE
AND HEARSAY EVIDENCE In an action for personal injuries suffered in

1940)

I

F. R. D. 215.

It will be noticed that the witness's refusal to answer the questions propounded was based solely on the ground of privilege. Yet the court passes over
the question of privilege,2 and apparently of its own motion decides the case upon
the ground of the inadmissibility of hearsay matter. In a case in the district court
for Maryland,8 the court held that an insurance adjuster employed by the
defendant bus company's insurer must answer questions asking for the names
and addresses of the persons known to him who were present at the scene of the
accident, but could not be required to divulge the information derived from such

1 Rule 26 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establishes when depositions
may be taken. Rule 26 (b) : "Unless otherwise ordered by the court as provided by
Rule 30 (b) or (d), the deponent may be examined regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether
relating to the claim or defense of the examining party or to the claim or defense of
any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and
location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location
of persons having knowledge of relevant facts."
2 Principal case, I F. R. D. 215 at 217: ''Without considering whether the matters inquired of in the deposition sought to be taken here were 'privileged,' our view
is that the rule is not to be construed as requiring answers to such questions as were
asked." Holding that questions as to privileged matters were not to be answered: Grauer
v. Schenley Products Co., (D. C. N. Y. 1938) 26 F. Supp. 768 (attorney-client);
E.W. Bliss Co. v. Cold Metal Process Co., (D. C. Ohio 1940) 1 F. R. D. 193 (same).
8 State of Maryland for use of Montvilla v. Pan-American Bus Lines, (D. C. Md.
1940) I F. R. D. 213.
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persons! Both these cases arise under rule 26 of the federal rules of civil procedure.5 Differing from many rules of discovery, rule 26 provides for a pre-trial
procedure which serves the dual purpose of discovering facts for the preparation
of a case and of obtaining testimony for use on trial. 6 The distinction between
these two functions of the rule must be observed in order to assure its proper
application with reference to hearsay matter. In the instant case and in the
Maryland case it is held that hearsay proof is inadmissible upon the deposition
examination.7 But in applying the hearsay rule a distinction should be drawn
between proof of the truth of an assertion, in which instance the hearsay rule
applies, and proof of the making of an assertion, in which instance it does not. 8
The rule would not apply where the names and addresses of the persons reported
to have been present at the scene of the accident are offered merely as proof
of their presence, not as proof of their actual presence. The questions in both
cases were propounded, not to prove the presence of certain persons at the scene
of the accident by what the insurance investigator learned from witnesses ( this
being hearsay), but to obtain the names and addresses of those persons reported
to have been present so that the examining party might seek them out and
question them as to the occurrence in issue.9 By excluding the inquiry in the
principal case the court limited the clue-seeking, discovery phase of rule 26. The
Maryland case, on the other hand, recognizes the investigatory purpose of the
rule
being an important feature of the deposition-discovery procedure. The
language of the rule indicates that it was drafted in contemplation of just such

as

'Cf. Barter v. Eastern S.S. Lines, (D. C. N. Y. 1939) l F. R. D. 65, where
the court said that questions as to names of anyone knowing "anything about the accident'' need not be answered because such a general question was not contemplated by
the rule.
5
Quoted supra, note 1.
6
See Bachrach v. General Investment Corp., (D. C. N. Y. 1940) 31 F. Supp.
84 at 86.
7
Accord: Kenealy v. Texas Co., (D. C. N. Y. 1939) 29 F. Supp. 502; Rose Silk
Mills, Inc., v. Insurance Co. of North America, (D. C. N. Y. 1939) 29 F. Supp. 504.
8
6 WIGMORE, EvrnENcE, 3d ed., § 1766 ( 1940): "The theory of the Hearsay
rule is that, when a human utterance is offered as evidence of the truth of the fact
asserted in it, the credit of the asserter becomes the basis of our inference, and therefore the assertion can be received only when made upon the stand, subject to the test
of cross-examination. If, therefore, an extrajudicial utterance is offered, not as an
assertion to evidence the matter asserted, but without reference to the truth of the
matter asserted, the Hearsay rule does not apply."
9
Where the examination is had for the sake of discovering clues for the preparation
of the case, and the presence of certain persons is reported through such examination,
the report obviously is useful to the examining party only as a guide to further investigation of the case, not as testimony on trial. One should note that there is a distinction
between the scope of the examination and the use of the results of the examination
on trial. As Professor Sunderland said: "There is no restriction whatever on the right
to take, and it may therefore be said that unlimited disco'Oery is contemplated. But
there are very definite restrictions on the right to use the depositions. Unlimited proof
by deposition is therefore not contemplated." Sunderland, "Discovery before Trial
under the New Federal Rules," 15 TENN. L. REv. 737 at 741-742 (1939).
Cf. Lewis v. United Air Lines Transport Corp., (D. C. Conn. 1939) 27 F.
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use as that attempted in the principal case,1° a use which would help to realize
the ultimate purpose of the federal rules of civil procedure to effect the determination of actions as justly, speedily and inexpensively as possible.11
J amille G. Jamra

Supp. 946 at 947, 948: "That the examination may develop useful information by way
of discovery which may not be admissible or material upon the precise issue is aside
from the point; to the extent that the examination develops useful information it
functions successfully as an instrument of discovery, even if it produces no testimony
directly admissible•.•• But under Rule 26 (b) a party is entitled by way of discovery
to information, such for instance as 'the identity and location of persons having
knowledge of relevant facts,' which obviously is not directly admissible in evidence. • ••
The examination, under the rule, is not to be restricted to matters which are material or
admissible."
10 The rule is quoted in note 1, supra. Note especially the express reference to
"the identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts."
11 Rule 1. And see Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. North Carolina Pulp Co., (D. C. Del.
1938) 25 F. Supp. 596 at 597•

